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Creationist Resistance
to Evolution:
The Patriarchal Unconscious
as the Key
ROBERT BATES GRABER
LADELLE MCWHORTER

Enlightened scientists and educators everywhere lament the persistence
of disbelief in the process of evolution through natural selection, but they
have done little to illuminate the psychological basis of this resistance.
This neglect unfortunately applies even to psychoanalytic commentators,
who, while uncovering oedipal elements in evolutionism, have remained
silent about creationism. We believe, however, that psychoanalysis has
much to offer toward a solution of the problem of creationism's
persistence. In particular, we propose that evolutionary theory stirs a
profound fear, rooted in the psychosexual developmental processes
characterizing human society thus far, of female power.
OEDIPAL EvoLUTIONISM

It is Darwin's illness, not creationism's persistence, that has been the
main focus of psychoanalytic interest. This focus, however, also has
produced a coherent interpretation of his evolutionary theory. Colp
(1977), in a comprehensive volume on the subject of Darwin's health,
summarizes ably this small literature, concluding that these studies
generally postulate that repressed hostility toward his father contributed
significantly, in one way or another, to Darwin's illness. According to
one especially succinct formulation, Darwin's symptoms-chiefly upset
We thank Donald Tuzin and an anonymous reviewer for incisive and provocative criticisms
of an earlier draft of this paper. Faculty research grants from Northeast Missouri State
University for the summer of 1987 supported our work.

168

ROBERT BATES GRABER/LADELLE MCWHORTER

stomach and vomiting, various disturbances of the skin and heart, and
sensations of "black dots" and "swimming head" (pp. 96-99)- were both
a "distorted expression" of Darwin's unconscious hate for his "tyrannical" father and a self-inflicted punishment for that hate. His theory,
then, was a ''transposing" of the unconscious emotional conflict into a
conscious intellectual one-a "typical obsessional" form of disguised
oedipal rebellion through which he "slew the Heavenly Father in the
realm of natural history" (Good, 1954, p. 106). 1
Jones (1959) suggests that the discovery of the relation of natural
selection to evolution "meant displacing God from His position as a
detailed Creator specially concerned with mankind, and removing Him
to an infinitely remote distance-at least in Natural Theology" (pp.
203-204). This phrasing calls to mind the plan regularly concocted by
oedipal children, according to which the same-sex parent can go far
away, perhaps to live with a grandparent; unconsciously, there seems
little difference between sending people away and destroying them. Jones
buttresses his case by attributing to Darwin the remark that asserting the
mutability of species was "like committing murder."
These passages, which may be taken as representing, in broad outline,
a straightforward Freudian view, cannot quite be accepted without
qualification. First, Good's (1954) stereotyping of Darwin's father as
"tyrannical," and the tacit assumption that having had such a father
helps explain Darwin's illness and theory, is a voice from a past in which
psychoanalytic concepts all too often were applied in a mechanical,
grossly oversimplified way (Graber and Miles, 1989). Second, Jones, in
quoting Darwin, commits a parapraxis that, so far as we know, has not
been noted previously in print. Darwin's remarkable comparison involved not "committing" a murder, but "confessing" to one. The
occasion was a letter to botanist J.D. Hooker, dated 11 January 1844apparently Darwin's first communication of his theory: "At last gleams
1

Freud (1928) himself provided a story with a very different ending, in which arousal of
oedipal impulses, and their transposal into religious symbolism, led not to denial of the
Heavenly Father but to his affirmation. In this case, the sight of an old woman's body
on a dissecting table stirred a medical student's feelings for his mother, accompanied by
repressed hostility toward his father. Reaction formation against this hostility, displaced
into religion, made the atheist into a theist.Perhaps nature can play a role analogous to
that of the old woman on the dissecting table. Freud (1910) suggested that the study of
nature can be a sublimation- the "highest attainable" by humans- of oedipal attraction
to mother (p. 122). If naturalists are considered in this light, two reactions may occur:
one, the pre-Darwinian, was a submissive affirmation of faith in God; the other, the
Darwinian, is a rebellious denial of God-at least of God's direct control over life's
development.
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of .li~ht have com~, and I am almost convinced (quite contrary to the
opmwn I started with) that species are not (it is like confessing a murder)
immutable" (Darwin, 1896, p. 384, italics added). A likely interpretation
of Jones's mental error is simply that "committing" would have been a bit
more. graphic than "confessing," given that Jones's immediate purpose
was simply to argue for the parricidal symbolism in Darwin's theory. Yet
Darwin's verb, by making the "murder" a fait accompli, more accurately
describes his own dilatory behavior: he had formulated the theory earlier
and by 1844 had been concealing the awful "crime" from everyone for
years (Colp, 1977, p. 25). The commission was past; the time for
confession had come. 2
Despite such flaws in the particulars of its presentation, we find
compelling the contention that evolutionary theory originated, in part in
repressed parricidal impulses. But what has that to do with evolutionism
today? After all, the theory is no longer new, and many people seem to
learn and accept it matter of factly. This is true but by no means proves
that evolutionism has lost altogether the unconscious meaning it had for
Darwin. Ours is still a society in which many people believe in God the
Father, and not a few among them believe he created life suddenly in the
forms we find today. It seems likely that, at least for people taught such
ideas in childhood, evolutionism would continue to have basically the
unconscious meaning it apparently had for Darwin.

CREATIONISM AS PARRICIDAL FANTASY

Supposing evolutionism to be, inter alia, symbolic parricide, we now
demand "equal time" for creationism, not in the science classroom but on
the psychoanalytic couch. Freudianism commits one to the possibility
that the same impulse can express itself in different-and even apparently contrary-ways. Therefore, accepting the view that evolutionism
can express parricidal impulses does not rule out the possibility that
creationism too can express parricidal impulses. Because this proves to be
the case, we shall need to look elsewhere for the fundamental psychological difference between evolutionism and creationism.
2

We agree with Colp (1977, p. 125) that Darwin's fears about how his theory would be
received were to a considerable extent realistic. These realistic fears concerned not only
institutional and personal rejection, but also real deficiencies of the theory at that point.
An interesting recent contribution (Richards, 1983) to the problem of Darwin's delay
discusses his struggle with the deep problem posed by the adaptiveness of instinctual
behaviors in sterile insect castes.
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Recognition of creationism's suitability for symbolizing parricide was
forced upon us by a creationist pamphlet, tellingly titled Big Daddy?
(Chick, 1972). Denied permission to publish representative frames, we
must content ourselves here with a relatively pallid verbal description.
The pamphlet cover leaves little doubt as to what father is about to be
slain-not the good Heavenly Father, but a bad, banana-munching
Missing Link no upstanding citizen would want to call "Dad." ("Could it
be," Nietsche once asked mischievously, "that moralists harbor a hatred
of the primeval forest?") The pamphlet's first page shows an ugly,
oily-looking Professor of Anthropology confidently introducing his
audience to the subject of evolution and symbolically identifies the
professor with the primitive hominid whose portrait hangs behind him.
Suddenly, Professor meets unaccustomed opposition from a clean-cut,
impeccably polite Young Man who in subsequent frames refers to the
Bible as the basis of his disbelief in evolution- eliciting a rude and
obviously irrational outburst from Professor. Not to be intimidated,
Young Man, remaining calm and reasonable, engages Professor in an
extended exchange. Professor soon is perspiring profusely because every
point he tries to make has been parried brilliantly- but always politelyby Young Man, who is gradually establishing beyond doubt, and to the
growing admiration and glee of his classmates, his superior grasp of the
data and theories involved. Freudian anthropologists impressed by recent
arguments for a literal primal parricide (Paul, 1976; Badcock, 1980) may
find especially significant Professor's ominous regret at not having
thrown Young Man out of the increasingly unruly class ("horde"?) when
he'd had the chance. The coup de grace lands a few frames later when
Young Man dazzles classmates and Professor alike by using nuclear
physics (specifically, the positive charge of protons) to "prove" that it is
the Bible, not science, that can truly explain why matter holds together.
Finally, Professor, now even more clearly identified with Link, whose
portrait he lugs, dejectedly departs the scene of his humiliating defeat at
the hands of Young Man. The words ouR FATHER have appeared
mysteriously beneath the portrait, as if to remove any doubt in the
reader's mind as to the directness of the competition between Heavenly
Father and Missing Link- imagos, of course, of the "good" and "bad"
father-for the hearts of humankind.
THE APoTHEOSis oF MoTHER NATURE

Yet there is an important sense in which this competition is indeed not
direct. Our evolutionary ancestors did not control the history of life on
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earth and in that respect cannot fill the "power vacuum" evolutionism
may appear, to a highly animistic unconscious, to create. If God did not
guide and oversee the origin and development of life-at least not
directly, though evolutionism surely allows God to lie behind the whole
thing- Who or What did? It seems likely that in many people, especially
those attracted to theistic notions, there is a special type of animistic
projection, viz., an actual psychological need to place a more or less
anthropomorphic force in charge of any seemingly orderly process or
event. On this assumption, we immediately notice that evolution gives us
the theory of natural selection; and, to be anthropomorphic about it
(which is our explicit task), we suspect that the creationist unconsciously
assumes that evolutionism fills the "power vacuum" by apotheosizing
Mother Nature. 3
We notice immediately that a fantasy of domination by mother differs
from, and presumably would be less gratifying than, the typical oedipal
fantasy of taking the place of the same-sex parent with the opposite-sex
parent. Yet beyond this lie other psychodynamic factors, to be discussed
later, that lead to the expectation that the fantasy of domination by
mother would be not merely less than optimally gratifying, but positively
disturbing. Infantile subordination to mother is among the tendencies
that the individual must transcend developmentally; well may the mind
reject an idea, such as evolution, if that idea threatens (unconsciously) to
undo so hard-won a victory.
We believe, then, that the disturbing quality of the fantasy of mother
domination (or of female power, in more general form) owes to dynamic
factors; but the ability of the theory of evolution by natural selection to
stir this disturbing fantasy is a problem of a different sort. That is,
evolutionism becomes a credible trigger of the dynamically rooted fear
only to the extent that we can establish a symbolic personification, in our
cultural milieu, of nature as mother. Some might argue that ontogenetic
dynamic processes alone account for this conceptualization, that each
generation in effect produces it anew, though a given generation might
appear to be receiving it as part of its social heredity from past
generations. In that case, our theory would require no reinforcement by
cultural and historical evidence. On that assumption, however, personification of nature as mother should either be culturally universal or vary
3

The paired symbolic equations on which our paper is based, God-father and Naturemother, were noted by Freud (1910): " ... the almighty and just God, and kindly
Nature, appear to us as grand sublimations of father and mother, or rather as revivals
and restorations of the young child's ideas of them" (p. 123).
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only in response to the variations- apparently modest- in the degree of
female responsibility for early child care; but we strongly suspect that
cultures vary, in the presence and salience of this personification, far too
much to account for in this way. If we are correct about this, the presence
of such a personification -let alone a salient one- in a given society may
not be assumed, but must be demonstrated; and because that personification is a symbolic artifact, the demonstration entails examination of
cultural data. To that demonstration we now turn.
The image of nature as female is ubiquitous in our culture. From the
"Mother Nature" who tries to sell us margarine, to the image of forests
as ''virgin," to our dreams of the "Mother Lode," nature personified is
almost always female. One could assert, however, that these personifications of nature are poetic devices merely; modern Euro-American
peoples do not believe that nature really is female, as South Pacific
islanders might be said to believe that volcanoes are female or as
Mediterranean peoples once believed that the change of the seasons was
due to the fertility cycle of a goddess. We might be tempted to claim that
we have outgrown such beliefs.
But such a claim would be hasty, to say the least. The association of
nature with femaleness is very much a part of modern Euro-American
culture in at least three important ways: (1) it is embedded in our
language; (2) it is deeply rooted in the western metaphysical traditions
that structure our modern world view; and (3) it appears time after time
in the literature that we revere as the best ever produced in the western
world, the literature that moves us still today. If our case is plausible,
then surely it makes sense to say that even now, at least on an
unconscious level, nature is Mother Nature; the physical world is female.
English is one of the few modern European languages that do not
genderize all common nouns. In other European languages words for
nature take feminine articles, and their adjectives receive feminine
inflections. But even English carries some half-buried feminine associations in its naming of the physical world. Of special interest here is a
word quite common in popular scientific discourse, the word matter.
Matter is directly linked to the word materia, which is akin to matrix,
another word for womb. Even more obvious is the link between matter
and mater, moder, and, finally, mother. 4
"The word matter comes to English from the Romance languages. It is akin to the Latin
materia, a word associated with yet older terms for trees or wood, in other words,
building material, the living stuff of which things are made. Materia is related to the
word matrix, or matrice, which in early Latin meant pregnant animal, and in later Latin
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Perhaps even more interesting than the language itself is the use to
which it was put in the development of western metaphysics, the
metaphysics that still animates much contemporary popular religious, if
not also scientific, thought. Greek philosophy in its Greek form was lost
to western Europe until the 12th century. Christianity developed out of
the disparate traditions of Judaism and the Hellenistic philosophies of
the Neoplatonists and Stoics, whose texts were handed down in Latin or
in many cases, in Latin translations from the Greek. The Stoics believed
that the natural world was a single, conscious, living being producing all
things, literally out of its body. Needless to say, this world-being was
female (Merchant, 1980, p. 3).
Christians were less amenable to stoic cosmology, however, than to
the cosmology of Plato as interpreted by Neoplatonists. It was the
Neoplatonic Plato until the 12th century and then Aristotle who were to
have the biggest impact upon Christian metaphysical thought.
Plato's Timaeus contains his story of world creation. There, through
the mouth of Timaeus, Plato explains that there are two separate realms,
the realm of the perfect, unchanging, intangible, rational Forms and the
realm of the chora (xwpa), undifferentiated, unqualified, chaotic, irrational extension, or space. The chora is a kind of existing non-being
(Eslick, 1963). The demiurg, "looking" at the perfect Forms, shapes in
the realm of Extension copies of what he sees. However, because the
medium of the demiurg is the chora- sometimes translated in Plato as
"receptacle" and elsewhere simply as "country" or "expanse of land"these creations can never be perfect. The chora itself accounts for the
difference between copy and Form; for that which has extension, that
which is tangible, is divisible, or, as the medievals put it, is corruptible.
This chora, then, makes the world imperfect, unstable, and deathly.
Plato seeks release from the shadowy impermanence of this cavelike
came to mean uterus or womb. We still see the word matrix used in English to mean
womb as late as the 19th century (Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "matrix''). It has since
taken on the broader meaning of a grid, web, or tissue upon which something depends
or out of which it emerges.
Both matrice and materia can be linked with mater, which in Middle English becomes
moder and in modern English, mother. In sum, that out of which all things come and
upon which they at least sometimes depend is living matter, matrix, that is, mother.
We should not underestimate the impact of the Latin language upon the formation of
the modern mind. Until fairly recently Latin was a child's discipline and was therefore
well known to every man of science or letters. Even after Vatican II there is still a sense
in which Latin is the language in which one expresses reality or truth. Goldenrod, for
instance, is "really" Solidago viraurea.
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world (which even non-Freudian scholars identify as "the mother")
through pursuit of the rational Forms.
Aristotle, whose works were reintroduced into western Europe in the
12th century and assimilated into Church doctrine through the efforts of
Thomas Aquinas, commented on the Timaeus more than on any other
Platonic dialogue. Aristotle preferred the word hu/e (uA71) rather than the
word chora, as the name for the opposite of Form. Aristotle's hute, like
Plato's chora, is the bare, existing "stuff' from which formed or ordered
things emerge (Weisheipl, 1963, p. 150). (Hule, like the Latin materia, is
a feminine noun also meaning "wood" or "building material," facts used
by Freud [1916-1917, pp. 159-160] to explain why wood sometimes
symbolizes "woman.'')
Among Aristotle's voluminous output was De Generatione Animalium, where he contends that female animals contribute only the huM out
of which their offspring emerge; the male contributes the form. Semen is
the shaper of the hule. If semen is allowed to do its work properly, to
overcome the recalcitrance of the huM, the child will be a healthy,
handsome male. If, however, the huM resists the semen successfully, the
child will be deformed ("de-formed"), possibly female (femaleness being
a deformity for Aristotle as it is later for Aquinas). s
Galen disagreed with Aristotle's position, arguing that females actually do contribute part of the offspring's form. But the issue continued to
be debated in theological circles through the Middle Ages and was not
finally laid to rest until the existence of the ovum was verified with the
use of a microscope.
Aquinas- whose work surely still exerts a profound influence, both
directly (on the minds of parochial-school educated Catholics) and
indirectly (on all of us) through the pervasiveness of Catholicism in
western Christianity and, therefore, western culture-understood hu/eto
be equivalent to the Latin materia and so translated it, as did other
medieval commentators. For Thomas materia, matter, is passive and
unknowable, without actuality or rationality, just as Plato's chora was.
Many commentators take chora and hu/e to be virtually identical
5

1n "On the First Man" Aquinas (1978) wrote, "As regards the individual nature, woman is
defective and misbegotten, for the active power in the male seed tends to the production
of a perfect likeness according to the masculine sex; while the production of woman
comes from defect in the active power, or from some material indisposition, or even
from some external influence, such as that of a south wind, which is moist ... " (pp.
80-81). Woman is the result of a failure of the (male) forming power to overcome the
recalcitrance of the (female) material. For an interesting treatment of Aristotle's
position, see Lange, 1983, pp. 1-17.
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(Archer-Hind, 1888, p. 183). Thus we can trace the history ofthe concept
from chora, to hute, to materia, to matter. But whatever the name, the
characterization remains; matter is irrational (unknowable, undifferentiated, chaotic), stubborn (refuses to hold form, tends to return to an
undifferentiated state), and the source of corruption (because anything
that occupies space logically can be divided; tangibility always entails the
possibility of dissolution or death). When medieval Christians speak of
matter as irrational, stubborn, and the source of corruption, it is very
hard even today not to hear the name of Eve, and certainly for the
medievals they were closely associated. Both are set in opposition to
rationality, order, morality, and the eternal will of God.
By the Middle Ages, then, nature, the physical world, matter in
general, is decidedly female. She is Mother Nature, and she, like any real
mother, has her good and bad moods. In the late Middle Ages we see
Mother Nature with two distinct faces. She is, on one hand, the gentle,
comforting, nurturing mother who takes care of her children's physical
needs- the natural world of Geoffrey Chaucer and later of Edmund
Spencer and John Milton (Merchant, 1980, chapter 1) On the other hand,
she is the frightening, powerful, death-wielding female who stands
opposed to the order and immortality promised us by Father God. This
ambiguity is neatly captured in medieval iconography.
By the 13th century, cathedral art depicted the mundane world as Frau
Welt, or Dame Nature. "Dame nature, from the front, has a beckoning
smile and courtly attire, but from the back she is revealed to be covered
with the foul, reptilian creatures of hell and the grave" (Ruether, 1983, p.
81). To the average Christian, the message was clear. The world, as
woman, is to be renounced, despite her charms, in favor of the love of
eternality and the goodness of God. Furthermore, the love of real
women, like the love of earthly riches, must be shunned, for it corrupts
a man's eternal soul and leaves him vulnerable to abandonment, pain,
and death.
In 1486, Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger, two Dominicans
under orders from Innocent VIII, published Malleus Mallificarum, the
Inquisition's manual on witchcraft. For the next 300 years all across
Europe witches were burned at the stake, were drowned in specially
constructed witch tanks, or were beaten and broken on wheels, racks,
and other instruments of torture. Many estimates put the death toll at
nine million. In some towns no women were left alive (Dworkin, 1974,
pp. 118-150).
All women, all those who possess a matrix, are carnal, lustful, fleshy,
enmired in the physical world, the world that threatens man in his project
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of self-perfection, in his dream of eternal life. Hence, in some sense it
seems logical to say that womb (matrice) simply means, simply is, the
physical world. (We cannot resist mentioning again that many English
scholars have translated Plato's chora as "receptacle," the receptacle of
the seminal activity of the god.) Women are to be avoided because by
showing the Christian man the joys of the flesh and of this world, they
divert him from the joys of heaven, the Other World. Women are terribly
dangerous, doubly signifying death. They must be controlled, even to the
point of torture and execution.
But not all witchhunts were, in common parlance, "witchhunts."
There were real witches, women who practiced the religion of Wicca and
who were at least the ostensible objects of the Inquisition's search. Wicca
is an ancient goddess religion. Witches believe that the goddess whom
they worship permeates the material world, in fact, is the material world.
In Wicca there is no male god set apart from the matter of his creation.
No divine orderer dominates the goddess. She is the mother of all, both
order and disorder. She is both rationality and chaos. This goddessmother-nature is all powerful. She can be loved, learned from, obeyed,
and depended on, but she cannot be controlled (Starhawk, 1979).
Simultaneous with the witchhunts came the rise of modern science.
Francis Bacon used the language of the witch trials to describe his new
method for the investigation of natural phenomena. Bacon frequently
made statements to the effect that the "inquisition of nature is [not] in
any part interdicted or forbidden" but that nature must be "bound into
service," made a "slave," put in "constraint," and made to reveal herself
in the grasp of man's mechanical instruments of interrogation (Merchant, 1980, p. 169). (In this respect Bacon sounds rather more like an
"applied" scientist than a "pure" one.) Bacon, writing in the 17th century,
still personified nature using the categories of Plato's Timaeus. Matter,
a "common harlot," "is not devoid of an appetite and inclination to
dissolve the world and fall back into the old Chaos." The harlot,
therefore, must be "restrained and kept in order" (Merchant, 1980, p.
171). Nature must be controlled if man is to live in peace and security on
this earth.
The witchhunts did not end until the 18th century. At the beginning of
the 19th century, Europe entered the age of Romanticism, when nature
became a loving mother (or bride) who comforted urban man after a
hard day's toil. Nature was appreciated among the poets in her passive
beauty, while she simultaneously was subjected to the interrogations of
Baconian scientists. Nature was being tamed. It was into this milieu that
Charles Darwin was born.
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Through the 19th century nature was popularly personified as a
woman, but she was no longer threatening. In leisure she was to be
enjoyed; in work she was to be husbanded, bent to the will of
technological man. No longer too mysterious, no longer too powerful,
nature was subservient. Wordsworth, praising technology in "Steamboats, Viaducts, and Railways," wrote that "Nature doth embrace/Her
lawful offspring in Man's art." Nature's loveliness may be somewhat
marred by man's use and manipulation of her elements; still, the
products of man's interaction with nature are her legitimate children.
Man is her lawful husband; she, his accommodating bride. But there is
ambivalence in Tennyson's "In Memoriam A.H.H." (1849):
Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature sends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems,
So careless of the single life,
That I, considering everywhere
Her secret meaning in her deeds,
And finding that of fifty seeds
She often brings but one to bear ...
Tennyson goes on to express his hope that God is still somehow in
control and we are not at the mercy of this seemingly irrational and
pain-inflicting Female. This poem was written ten years before Darwin
published Origin of Species.
Nature was a woman for well over 2,000 years. Though, as we suggest
later, the strength of this personification may be waning, it would be
more than a little surprising if all trace of it had vanished; and clearly
that is not the case. We often attribute feminine qualities to nature in our
everyday speech, and the margarine commercial to which this section
earlier alluded is evidence that a female nature is a widely recognizable
icon in popular culture. It is, then, absurd to think that nature's old
gender identity exercises no power over us, even if we are not often
conscious of it; the association was once too powerful to have dissipated
so readily. Thus, we contend, the traces of nature's femininity still borne
by our speech and perpetuated by our poets, conservationists, and
Madison Avenue executives are not meaningless remnants of a long-dead
mythopoeic world view. They are, rather, the overt manifestations of a
vital, socially transmitted personification of the natural world as female,
as a mother, a matrix, from which we all emerge and upon whose care
and hoped-for constancy we all depend for physical survival.
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DISSONANCE WITH THE "PATRIARCHAL UNCONSCIOUS"

With the poet's sensitivity, Tennyson felt the coming storm and sensed in
himself a conflict we believe characterizes the creationist today: God is
supposed to be love, but nature, his creation, appears cruel. Nature
drives life forms to reproduce far beyond the number that can survive
and kills off the surplus. Yet in a few years evolutionism would make this
cruelty the very core of natural history, and God simply irrelevant (as
must any scientific idea qua science) (cf. Colp, 1977, p. 30).
Having just argued that nature symbolizes femaleness, especially
mother, we now see that evolutionism makes of her a real mother, as our
sexist slang might put it. Domineering and life-destroying, she is not at
all what femininity in general, or mothering in particular, is supposed to
be. Evolutionism, in the unconscious mind of the creationist, replaces
father with mother, and with a kind of witch-mother at that. It could be
objected that creationists as a whole lack sufficient knowledge of
evolutionary theory to draw this conclusion; yet does the conclusion
really require one to have heard much more than the cliche that evolution
posits "survival of the fittest"?
If evolutionism indeed unconsciously appears to the creationist to put
a cruel matriarchy where a benevolent patriarchy was, two facts about
creationism fall immediately into place. First, its chief locus is among
fundamentalist Christians with rigidly traditional notions of proper sex
roles. It is precisely such people our theory would "predict" should be
especially threatened by evolutionism's symbolic sex-role inversion.
Second, creationism seems to correlate strongly with aversion to abortion. This fits well, because in deciding on abortion, a woman arrogates
for herself the "male" prerogative of willful, active power over life and
death. Rather than take control, women ought to create life passively out
of their natural substance (Rosaldo and Atkinson, 1975). A mother's
control over the fate of her fetus is a sort of microcosm of Mother
Nature's control over the fate of species; thus abortion is as repugnant as
evolutionism, and for the very same reason. (It cannot be claimed that
aversion to abortion stems from a Christian protectiveness toward
human life in general, because fundamentalist Christians seldom speak
out against warfare or capital punishment.)
These links joining creationism to rigid sex-role stereotyping and to
abhorrence of abortion provide two instances of "independent confirmation" of the centrality, in creationism, of fear of female power.
Underlying the relatively superficial association of creationism with
political conservativism, then, is a psychological consistency not only
deeper, but at the same time more specific, than has been recognized
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before. We wish to underscore these successes at "predicting" deep
psychological consistencies- another instance of which will be provided
near this chapter's end- because they are among the hallmarks of
evidential veracity whenever psychoanalysis is applied, whether to clinical or cultural phenomena.
Whence comes this deep aversion to anything hinting of female
empowerment? The easy answer would be that these patriarchal attitudes
are taught, along with creationism, by the churches to which the people
happen to belong. This, however, would imply a truly anti-Freudian
perspective on the psychological import of religion. Religion in the main
does not create unconscious conflicts; it speaks to them. When it fails to
provide "therapy," it is either modified or discarded (Brenner, 1974, p.
212). True in any society, this is pronounced in societies having many
religions, because people can gravitate to the faith that best meets their
psychic needs. We therefore cannot ascribe creationism (or antiabortionism or strict sex roles) simply to conscious teaching; we must look
more deeply, into the psychic differentiation of the sexes.
From a psychoanalytic perspective, the classic text surely is "Some
Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the
Sexes" (Freud, 1925). The conclusions in this late paper were presented
very tentatively because Freud felt he had an insufficient number of cases
on which to base them. They were put forth as hypotheses for further
study.
Freud proposed that little boys routinely react to their first glimpse of
the female genital region with either "horror of the mutilated creature or
triumphant contempt for her" (p. 252). Little girls typically react to the
sight of the male genital region with envy, which, except to the extent
that it leads to a masculinity complex, leads to a sense of inferiority and
a concomitant concurrence with the contempt felt by men for a lesser sex
(p. 253). In terms of oedipal development, this anatomical distinction
"corresponds to the difference between a castration that has been carried
out and one that has merely been threatened" (p. 257). We cannot go into
greater detail here; but Freud did go on to suggest, hesitantly, that this
difference may make the average female superego less "inexorable," less
"impersonal," and less "independent of its emotional origins" than in the
average male (p. 257). This, Freud continued, would explain traits
critics of every epoch have brought up against women- that they
show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to
submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often
influenced in their judgments by feelings of affection or hostility
[p. 258].
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Though Freud did not say that these traits make patriarchy natural or
inevitable, it seems that men generally would be better suited, under this
characterization of the sexes, to carry the burden of political decisionmaking. We shall return to this later.
The infantile reactions Freud described surely can be powerful. One of
us scrupulously taught a little daughter the correct name for her genital
right along with her other body parts, assuring her from the very
beginning that no boy had a vagina, or ever would, and that she had
never had a penis and never would; yet by the time she was three she
already had proposed that she had had a penis "when she was a baby,"
and, being told (again) that she had not, announced two weeks later that
she would get one "when she gets bigger." Clearly, it is not simply a
matter of teaching girls sufficiently early in life that they indeed have
something there.
Yet Freud's scheme seems overly mechanical and possibly overgeneralized, as the following case demonstrates. In a personal communication, a woman described her first glimpse of a penis at the age of four.
This experience occurred just after she had learned about how tadpoles
change to frogs, even watching them go through the stages in a swamp
near her home.

able on its face is the generalization about men having sterner superegos.
We can think readily of apparently guilt-ridden women and seemingly
guilt-free men. The hypothesis of significant average differences will
elude testing so long as psychoanalytic variables resist effective quantification. Even assuming such a difference, its cause would remain in
doubt.
Whatever the ultimate verdict on his 1925 paper, it by now seems
highly probable that Freud's stress therein on oedipal dynamics needs to
be modified by a consideration of preoedipal processes of separationindividuation. Indeed, Forrest's (1986) persuasive interpretation of antiabortionism as a fantasy attempt to "push the separation-individuation
from the mother as far as possible back into the mother's reign over the
child," invoking "the protective authority of the Heavenly Father as the
true Creator" (p. 152) provided the germ of the present paper.
Ideally, mother and child "let go of the early bond without rejecting"
one another (Flax, 1983, pp. 252). Unfortunately things go awry: the
little boy "consolidates his differentiation" by repressing the "female"
parts of himself (pp. 252-253). About this process-termed "disidentification" by Greenson (1968) and well described by Stoller (1968;
Stoller and Herdt, 1982)-Flax is far from sanguine:

Around that time the boy next door showed me his penis. He was
only four himself, so it didn't look like much of anything but an
extra tag of rubbery skin. He, or someone, assured me that all boys
had one. I was willing to believe that all boys had one, but I found
it hard to believe that a grown-up like my father (who I knew used
to be a boy) would have such a thing. I concluded that boys, like
tadpoles, had extra appendages that would gradually disappear as
they matured. I don't think I believed this for very long, but I can't
recall what changed my mind.

These defenses become part of ordinary male behavior toward
adult women and to anything which seems similar to them or under
their (potential) control- the body, feelings, nature. The ability to
control (and be in control) becomes both a need and a symbol of
masculinity. Relations are turned into contest [sic] for power.
Aggression is mobilized to distance oneself from the object and
then to overpower it. [p. 253, italics added].

This surely differs from Freud's terse, colorful generalization about the
little girl's first impression: "She makes her judgement [sic] and her
decision in a flash. She has seen it and knows that she is without it and
wants to have it" (Freud, 1925, p. 252). 6
If Freud's generalization on this score is questionable, more question6

We of course recognize the possibility that earlier, forgotten experiences underlie this one.
Still, the circumstance that her household was "almost thoroughly female" (no brothers,
her father often working seven days a week, sometimes 12-hour shifts), and the seeming
spontaneity of her reaction, make us think this unlikely.

Meanwhile, things unfold no better for the little girl, who overidentifies
with the nurturant figure and thus, in adulthood, "seeks relationships,
even at the expense of her own autonomy. The two genders thus come to
complement each other in a rather grotesque symmetry" (p. 253).
The problem in large part, according to Flax, is that the child's early
care has been entrusted so exclusively to the mother, or at least to a
female. Thus, the "grotesque symmetry" of adult gender relations owes
not to the anatomy of the sexes, but to the anatomy of patriarchal
societies-those in which "men as a group oppress women as a group" or,
less polemically, "men have more access to and control over the most
highly valued and esteemed resources and social activities" (p. 272). Of
course, "patriarchal society" is essentially coterminous with "human
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society" thus far, a fact of which Flax (p. 272) is well aware; therefore,
doing away with the "grotesque symmetry" is a project for the future.
Perhaps the sexual stratification of human society did originate in
anatomy. As the biological bearers and nurses of children, hominid
females from the beginning probably found their mobility limited
relative to that of males. This in turn probably restricted their activities
to more routine tasks near the band's camp. Scharf (1977), for example,
concludes that
the biology and psychology of reproduction and nurturance handicaps most women, in relation to all men, in the performance of
tasks involving wide-ranging movement or single-minded specialization, and also those which, because of unpredictable elements,
cannot be routinized. Thus arises not just a sexual division of labor
but an invidious sexual division of labor [p. 452].
Any sexual division of labor whatsoever would be functionally conducive
to differential socialization (and thus to psychosexual differentiation) of
the genders; but this particular sexual division of labor, with its exclusion
of men from early child care, seems almost contrived to complicate the
very differentiation it helps necessitate. Hence, the problems pointed up
by Flax: the tiny girl overidentifies with, while the tiny boy tries to
dissociate from, the nurturant behavior so exclusively associated, in their
experience, with femaleness.
With the technology of bottle-feeding and with improved contraceptives, however, the anatomical basis of sexual stratification is withering;
recent technological advances suggest that this basis may someday vanish
altogether. Meanwhile, there is no firm evidence that nature has
equipped females psychologically to be better caretakers of the very
young than are males, and should such evidence be forthcoming, it
would not preclude the desirability of greatly increased male involvement.
Because male involvement remains modest despite technological evolution making greater male involvement possible, the continuing femaleness of primary caretaking should be attributed more to social structure
than to biology. And we agree that the femaleness of caretaking in the
early years of life probably contributes greatly to, if it does not fully
cause, (1) the urgency of the growing boy's separation from mother and
the consequent vehemence of his scorn toward things feminine; and (2)
the extent of the growing girl's ambivalence toward mother and her
concurrence with the boy's assessment of femaleness.
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Whatever the relative contributions of biology and social structure in
causing the patriarchality of human society generally, contempt for
femaleness is widespread in our own society. Everyday life makes clear
that this is so even among ostensibly nonsexist males. A few random
examples of emanations from the patriarchal unconscious: His tongue
loosened by wine at a party, a most "progressive" man complains
scornfully that the goblet he holds is undersized- "stubby, suited for a
woman." Another equally enlightened college professor, learning that a
friend had several brothers but no sisters, jokes, "Wow, your father had
potent semen!" (The implication that women are products of inferior
semen is only a small remove from Aristotle's notion that recalcitrant
hule is to blame.) An interesting slip of the tongue: a man fairly
conversant with Freudianism found himself frustrated by a male colleague's obstinacy. Describing the situation to a friend, he referred to the
male colleague as "she." He immediately-and erroneously-interpreted
the slip as representing castrative aggression. Although this would reveal
scorn in the form of the infantile conception of female as castrated male,
the correct interpretation struck closer home. A female friend offered a
feminist interpretation: perhaps the resistance from his colleague was a
form of passive power felt suitable to a female rather than a male, whose
power "should" take an active form. This stimulated a line of associations leading to a comparison of the colleague's obstinacy with obstinacy
this the subject just then was encountering from his girlfriend. The slip
clearly meant "This colleague is behaving just like she is." The hasty,
ultraorthodox Freudian interpretation possibly acted as a defense against
the correct interpretation.
Scorn toward femaleness occasionally is obvious among men in
positions of great power. Informing President Truman of the first
successful test of a hydrogen bomb, physicist Edward Teller transmitted
the code phrase, "It's a boy!" Presumably a failure would have been a
girl. Lyndon Johnson associated doubt, uncertainty, thinking, questioning, and writing with femininity. Real men were doers. Perhaps an
infantile reaction to female anatomy was involved: Hearing that a certain
member of his administration was becoming a "dove" on Vietnam,
Johnson is quoted as saying, "Hell, he has to squat to piss" (Halberstam,
1969, p. 532).
Yet this apparent persistence of the patriarchal unconscious poses us
a glaring problem: How has the theory of evolution by natural selection
managed to gain so much acceptance against such formidable psychological resistance?
In the time since Darwin, bearing, nursing, and caring for the very
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young have remained largely female enterprises; but female activity is
less and less restricted to these enterprises. Women do many other things,
though admittedly still not with the freedom or rewards enjoyed by men
for the same activities. Under these changing social circumstances,
however, would we not expect the cultural personification of nature as
female to weaken? These changes would lead, thus, to a reduced ability
of evolutionism to stir the fantasy of female domination; meanwhile,
they would reduce the invidiousness of the sexual division of labor,
which, in turn, would place boys under less sociofunctional pressure to
dis-identify from all things "female" because the very line between male
and female activities is itself blurring. We suspect, too, that men are
taking a larger role in caring for very young children. Their parental
caregiving, while still modest, may already be sufficient at least to have
begun dulling the "edge" previously put on the patriarchal unconscious
by preoedipal separation-individuation dynamics. Dare we hope,
though, that such changes may be only particular mechanisms of a more
general psychocultural evolution toward greater maturity and better
reality-testing?
CREATIONISM, SciENCE, AND REALITY-TESTING

We have argued that creationism persists because of its consonance with
the patriarchal unconscious. Superficially this alone might seem to
render creationism unscientific, since scientific ideas are supposed to be
those held in virtue of their fit with objective evidence rather than with
psychological need. Yet to dismiss creationism simply because it fulfills
psychological needs would involve us in a contradiction, for have we not
already conceded that evolutionary theory may be held partly because of
psychological needs? Just as we must avoid considering an idea's
truth-value as dependent on its origin (the "genetic fallacy"), so must we
avoid basing an idea's scientific status on the (impossible) condition that
subjective motivations play no part in people's reasons for subscribing to
it. It turns out to be surprisingly easy to go astray in attempting to prove
evolutionism's scientific superiority, especially because science itself has
been defined so variously.
There are at least three common ways of formulating a definition of
science. One view, often associated with Francis Bacon, is that science is
not so much a practice as it is simply a body of facts. Used in the 1920s
by creationists (Numbers, 1982, p. 539), this definition makes discounting evolution easy indeed: after all, evolution is not a fact; it is a
theoretical model put forth to explain various phenomena.
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Discounting evolution may be equally easy for those who take a
Popperian view of science. Sir Karl Popper asserted that science is
essentially the practice of establishing a set of theoretical conjectures and
refutations; therefore, for a theory to qualify as scientific (rather than as,
say, metaphysical) it has to be subject to the possibility of refutation. In
other words, it must be falsifiable. Creationists can charge that evolutionism does not meet this criterion (Numbers, 1982, p. 543).
A third, more complex, view contends that science does not consist of
only one essential activity; rather, it is a set of interrelated activities. To
be a scientist, a person must engage in some of these activities. These
might include paradigm construction, field work, experimentation,
measurement, and publication of findings. One then could describe
science from a sociological perspective as a certain pattern of behavior
such that if a person does not engage in at least some of these activities,
then what is being done is not science. Scientists produce theories or
hypotheses; they collect evidence in the field or in the lab; they share their
ideas with colleagues by attending conferences; they publish papers.
Clearly evolutionists qualify as scientists under this description; creationists, many assert, do not. Scott and Cole (1985), for example, demonstrate that creationism virtually cannot be found in the mainstream
scientific literature and that its absence therefrom cannot easily be
accounted for by creationists' cries of "censorship." Yet this is not quite
decisive, because scientific practice involves much more than publication. Publication is merely one indicator of scientific activity; it alone is
not scientific activity itself. Despite not yet having published a paper,
surely a graduate lab assistant is engaging in scientific activity. And
creationists do apparently engage, once in a while, in scientific-like
activities involving natural history.
As it turns out, however, these scientific-like activities give precious
little support for creationism as a theory. Indeed, it is well documented
that most creationist research is not even intended to support the theory
of special creation; it is intended rather to discredit the theory of
evolution. Creationists allege that much of the evidence for evolutionary
theory comes from faulty dating procedures and misinterpreted geological data (Scott and Cole, 1985, p. 23). Now, certainly it is true that not
all claims of evolutionist scientists have been borne out. Some methods
of dating fossils are unreliable. Many questions remain to be answered.
No good scientist will accept uncritically just anything written by
proponents of evolutionary theory. Without taking the point as far as
Popper initially did, we surely agree that rigorous criticism is an essential
part of scientific practice. And insofar as creationists point out weak-
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nesses in scientific work, they are participating in that practice. What
they say may be erroneous or unhelpful, but some of it probably is
science.
However, criticism of someone else's theory does not equal support
for one's own. For, even if evolutionary theory were to be refuted
soundly tomorrow, we would have no positive evidence for the theory of
special creation. Creationists regularly commit the fallacy of the false
dilemma. They appear to assume that there are only two possible
accounts of life on earth- natural evolution or supernatural creation. In
fact, the dichotomies nature/supernature and evolution/creation immediately yield two other possibilities: (1) supernatural evolution, for
example, the widely held notion that evolution occurred, but under God's
direction; and (2) natural creation, for example, the possibility (wildly
inconsistent with the evidence) that all existing life forms were created
suddenly by some natural, rather than supernatural, cause. Therefore,
creationists' arguments against evolution certainly cannot constitute
arguments in favor of supernatural creation. Yet this fact alone does not
prove creationism nonscience; indeed, pointing out flaws in evolutionary
theory must be considered supportive of some alternative to the theory as
currently conceived, and creationism might appear to be one such
alternative.
However, there is a compelling argument against creationism's scientific pretensions: creationism, by invoking supernatural causation, violates one of the most basic assumptions of scientific discourse. Morris
(1974) writes, "Diametrically opposed to the evolution model, the
creation model involves a process of special creation which is: (1)
supernaturalistic; (2) externally directed; (3) purposive, and (4) completed" (p. 11). The real point of scientific creationism is that there is a
creator and that that creator is not natural, but supernatural.
There is nothing illogical about the assertion that a supernatural force
governs the universe, but there is also nothing scientific about it.
Scientific explanation is always natural explanation; explanations from
supernatural causes have no place in scientific discourse. Insofar as the
postulate of this supernatural creator is needed to make the theory
complete, creation science is not science.
This is not to say that science necessarily opposes all belief in the
supernatural. It simply cannot pronounce upon such possibilities and
cannot admit them into scientific discourse. Science does not disallow
God; it merely disallows God as an explanatory principle. Scientists can
believe in supernatural entities and doings, but when they discuss these
ideas they are speaking as poets, metaphysicians, or religious believers,
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not as scientists. (A striking example of such compartmentalization is Sir
John Eccles, eminent neuroscientist and devout Roman Catholic.)
Given, then, that creation science is not scientific, we are left with the
question of why creationists espouse the scientific label. Why are they
unhappy confining their speculations to the philosophy and religion
classes where they so clearly belong? In 1925, a proponent of creationism
wrote, "It is not 'science' that orthodox Christians oppose. No! no! a
thousand times, No! They are opposed only to the theory of evolution,
which has not yet been proved, and therefore is not to be called by the
sacred name of science" (Numbers, 1982, p. 539). In 1974 Morris wrote,
" 'Science' is knowledge, and the Bible is a book of true and factual
knowledge throughout, on every subject with which it deals. The Bible is
a book of science!" (p. 229).
These quotations indicate that some creationists believe- or at least
believe that the average person believes-that science equals truth. Since
most people, not being logicians, believe that whatever is not truth is
falsehood, and since most people see little value in falsehood, it is
imperative for creationists, given their naive and dangerous science-truth
equation, to appear to be scientific. Hence their borrowings from
scientific vocabulary, their public avoidance of religious language (Williams, 1983, p. 97), their think tanks and "research institutes," their
refusal to relegate their beliefs to courses in religion. Creationism has
become parasitic upon scientific discourse.
Is this parasitism conscious and intentional? That is, are the leading
creationists adorning themselves in the trappings of science, knowing full
well they have rejected its substance? Possibly, but by no means
necessarily. Religionists are always mistaking internal causes for external
ones. The "voice" telling one the morally right thing to do, for example,
is not recognized to come from within (superego) but is thought to come
from without (God). It thus would be quite consistent for creationists to
believe sincerely that they hold their position for external reasons
(objective evidence, hence, "science") rather than internal ones (patriarchal unconscious).
Though there is good reason to deny the existence of a creation
science, it is undeniable that a few of the leading creationists really are
scientists. Their expertise and their work, however, apparently have little
or nothing to do with ancient forms of life on earth. Let us close by
considering this handful of people in terms of the distinction between
pure and applied science. If nature is a female, it is the pure scientist's
task to understand her, to tease out her secrets; it is left to the applied
scientist to use these secrets to dominate her. Therefore, the theory we
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have presented "predicts" that scientists who are creationists, equipped as
they must be with a strongly patriarchal unconscious, would be suited
psychologically not for discovering about nature but for dominating her.
Scott and Cole (1985) report that between January, 1978, and
October, 1981, only six of the 28 most prominent "creation scientists"
published results of their work in refereed science journals; all of these
articles concerned research in such areas as "the chemistry and physics of
food processing, simulation studies of loads, vibrations and stresses in
aircraft wing structures, the effect of pollutants on aquatic microorganisms, etc." (p. 24). The overwhelmingly applied nature of this work we
consider strikingly consistent with the theory we have put forth, and thus
a third successful "prediction" (to add to the earlier "predictions" of
sex-role rigidity and abhorrence of abortion) of a deep psychological
consistency.
The evidential support for evolution's occurrence is not clearly
inferior to that for, say, the spheroidal shape of our planet. It would be
pleasant to be able to ascribe the persistence of creationism simply to
culture lag, to incomplete diffusion of this evidence-in brief, to
ignorance. We see, however, that creationism survives even among
highly educated people (though it is less common among them); and this
persistence seems to us best accounted for by the fear, created and
sustained by the patriarchal unconscious, of female empowerment.
But we may end on a more hopeful note. "The voice of the intellect is
a soft one," Freud (1927) wrote, "but it does not rest till it has gained a
hearing" (p. 53). To recognize the persistence of creationism is not to
deny the progress of evolutionism; indeed, is it not a tribute to restive
reason's gains in our own time that creationism itself must masquerade as
science-the cultural institutionalization of those reality-testing abilities
bequeathed to us by evolution through natural selection?
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